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BUCK V. DAVIS: ANTI-DISCRIMINATORY 
PRINCIPLES IN HABEAS CORPUS CASES 
Daniella Rubin* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The judicial system is built upon various principles. Some of 
these principles have developed over the course of this country’s 
history as a result of changing attitudes and perspectives.1 One of the 
most prevalent principles is the notion that every defendant will 
receive a fair trial, irrespective of their race.2 The creation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reflects a societal 
view that discrimination, particularly race-based discrimination, 
should be disallowed and condemned in the strongest sense. This 
Comment argues that anti-discriminatory notions necessarily 
associated with analysis of equal protection claims should be utilized 
even absent an equal protection claim. Specifically, where it is clear 
that race played any role in the prosecution of a defendant and 
particularly where the jury is charged with determining whether to 
sentence the defendant to death. Last term in Buck v. Davis,3 the 
Supreme Court issued an opinion that both considered the harmful 
effects of de facto racial discrimination in criminal cases, and opened 
the door for the application of Equal Protection principles in cases not 
involving Equal Protection claims.  
Part II of this Comment lays out the factual history of Buck v. 
Davis.  Part III recounts the trial and highlights the racially prejudicial 
testimony of the court-appointed expert witness. Part IV details 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Communications, 
University of California, San Diego, 2015. Thanks to Professor Hiro Aragaki for his mentorship 
and invaluable feedback both on this article and throughout my time in law school, to the members 
of Loyola of Los Angles Law Review for their hard work, and to family and friends for their support. 
 1. See, e.g., Destiny Peery, The Colorblind Ideal in a Race-Conscious Reality: The Case for 
a New Legal Ideal for Race Relations, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 473, 473 (2011) (discussing the 
surge of colorblindness under the law following Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection 
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF., 107, 119 (1976). 
        3.  137 S. Ct. 759 (2017). 
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Buck’s protracted appeals process, and Part V analyses the Court’s 
majority opinion and the dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas. 
Finally, part VI defends the outcome of the case and the Court’s 
willingness to engage with Equal Protection principles in a case 
devoid of Equal Protection claims. Part VII concludes. 
II.  FACTUAL HISTORY 
On July 30, 1995, Duane Buck entered the home of his then-
girlfriend, Debra Gardner, carrying a shotgun and a rifle.4 Upon 
entering, Buck shot his own stepsister, Phyllis Taylor, as well as 
Gardner’s friend, Kenneth Butler.5 Upon witnessing the shootings, 
Gardner and her children fled for their lives with Buck in pursuit.6 
Gardner’s children begged Buck to spare their mother’s life, but to no 
avail.7 Buck shot Gardner in the chest, killing her.8 Shortly thereafter 
police officers arrived at the scene and arrested Buck.9 Following the 
incident, only Taylor survived her wounds.10 
III.  TRIAL 
In 1995, Buck was prosecuted and convicted of capital murder in 
a Texas district court.11 In order to determine Buck’s sentence, the jury 
contemplated two primary considerations: (1) Buck’s “future 
dangerousness” and (2) possible mitigating circumstances.12 The first 
consideration of “future dangerousness” requires the jury to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that there is “a probability that the 
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing threat to society.”13 The second consideration, 
only to be reached if the first is answered “yes,” asks “whether 
mitigating circumstances nevertheless warrant a sentence of life 
imprisonment instead of death.”14 
 
 4. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 767. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 768. 
 10. Id. at 767. 
 11. Id. at 767–68. 
 12. Id. at 768; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, §§ 2(b)(1), (e)(1) (West 2006). 
 13. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 768 (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1) 
(West 2006)). 
 14. Id.; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(e) (West 2013). 
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The thrust of the sentencing portion of trial focused on the first 
question: whether Buck would inevitably pose a danger to society 
again in the future.15 The State’s case focused primarily on past 
behavior including, inter alia, Buck’s criminal record, past violent 
relationships, and his unusual upbeat behavior following the shootings 
while in custody.16 Defense counsel attempted to combat the negative 
testimony by calling family members and expert witnesses to the 
stand.17 The first expert, psychologist Dr. Patrick Lawrence, testified 
that he believed Buck committed a crime of passion.18 Dr. Lawrence 
further testified that during Buck’s previous incarceration, Buck never 
displayed signs of violence nor gang affiliation and, as such, was 
unlikely to be a danger should he be sentenced to life in prison.19 
The second expert, Dr. Walter Quijano, was appointed by the 
district court judge to conduct a psychological evaluation.20 After 
meeting with Buck in prison, Dr. Quijano wrote a report regarding his 
observations and shared his findings with defense counsel.21  Dr. 
Quijano used several statistical factors in his analysis, including 
race.22 The report included the following excerpt: “Race. Black: 
Increased Probability. There is an over-representation of Blacks 
among the violent offenders.”23 
At trial, the bulk of Dr. Quijano’s testimony was similar to that of 
Dr. Lawrence’s—he “thought it significant that Buck’s prior acts of 
violence had arisen from romantic relationships with women.”24At 
one point during Dr. Quijano’s testimony, defense counsel asked Dr. 
Quijano to discuss the statistical factors he considered.25 Consistent 
with his report, Dr. Quijano discussed the various factors, including 
race, noting that these factors are “known to predict future 
 
 15. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 768. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. Because the alternative to being sentenced to death is life imprisonment, the 
consideration of future dangerousness concerns the interaction between inmates and guards. See id. 
However, even this is a large inferential step from the testimony. See id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 768–69 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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dangerousness.”26 The report was then submitted into evidence.27 
During cross-examination of Dr. Quijano, the prosecutor inquired 
about the nature of the statistical factors: “You have determined that 
the sex factor, that a male is more violent than a female because that’s 
just the way it is, and that the race factor, black, increases the future 
dangerousness for various complicated reasons; is that correct?” Dr. 
Quijano responded “Yes.”28 During jury deliberations, the jury sent 
out a note requesting copies of all “psychology reports” that were 
admitted into evidence, including those provided by Dr. Quijano.29 At 
the end of the deliberations, the jury sentenced Buck to death.30 
IV.  THE APPEALS PROCESS 
A.  First State Petition  
On appeal, Buck’s conviction and sentence were affirmed.31 
Buck’s first state petition (“State Petition I”) for a writ of habeas 
corpus advanced four claims, none of which were related to defense 
counsel’s introduction of Dr. Quijano’s race-related testimony.32 
Buck’s State Petition I resulted in affirmation of his conviction and 
sentencing.33 During the time State Petition I was pending, another 
Texas case in which Dr. Quijano testified reached the United States 
Supreme Court.34 In Saldano v. Texas,35 the state of Texas confessed 
error and asked this Court to grant Saldano’s petition for certiorari, in 
light of the fact that his “death sentence had been tainted by Dr. 
Quijano’s testimony that . . . Saldano’s Hispanic heritage ‘was a factor 
weighing in the favor of future dangerousness.’”36 
The Texas Attorney General later issued a public statement 
regarding the cases in which Dr. Quijano had testified.37 The Attorney 
General declared, “it is inappropriate to allow race to be considered as 
a factor in our criminal justice system” and noted that his office would 
 
 26. Id. at 769. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
      35.   530 U.S. 1212 (2000). 
 36. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 769 (citing Saldano, 530 U.S. 1212). 
 37. Id. at 770. 
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be examining the other cases in which Dr. Quijano had served as an 
expert.38 Through his investigation, the Attorney General identified 
six cases which were similar to Saldano.39 Of those six cases, the 
Texas Attorney General “confessed error, waived any available 
procedural defenses, and consented to resentencing” in five.40 Despite 
having been one of the six originally identified cases, Buck was the 
remaining case in which the Texas Attorney General did not confess 
error.41 
B.  Second State Petition & First Federal Petition 
In 2002, Buck’s attorney then filed a second state habeas petition 
(“State Petition II”), “alleging that trial counsel had rendered 
ineffective assistance by introducing Dr. Quijano’s testimony.”42 The 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the case as an abuse of the 
writ due to the fact that the petition alleging ineffective counsel was 
successive.43  
In 2004, Buck then attempted to petition for habeas corpus in 
federal court under 28 U.S.C. section 2254 (“Federal Petition I”).44 
Buck’s argument was that the trial counsel’s choice to utilize Dr. 
Quijano’s testimony was “constitutionally ineffective.”45 In response, 
the State argued that Buck’s petition should be denied on procedural 
grounds because he waived his right to claim ineffective assistance of 
counsel when he did not raise the issue in State Petition I.46 The State 
further argued that despite having admitted error in other cases, 
Buck’s case was distinguishable as it was the defense who called Dr. 
Quijano to the stand.47 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (citing Ex parte Buck, 418 S.W. 3d 98, 105–06 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 15, 2003) 
dismissed per curiam). 
 44. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 770; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1996) (stating that: “(b)(1) An application 
for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
court shall not be granted unless it appears that—(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies 
available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; 
or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the 
applicant.”(emphasis added)). 
 45. See Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 770–71. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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At the time of Buck’s Federal Petition I, Coleman v. Thompson48 
was the controlling law on section 2254 habeas petitions.49 In 
Coleman, the United States Supreme Court “made clear that an 
attorney’s failure to raise an ineffective assistance claim during state 
post-conviction review could not constitute cause” for excusing a 
default.50 As a result, Buck was not able to argue his default should be 
excused on a showing of cause and prejudice.51 Thus, the district court 
deemed Buck’s ineffective assistance claim unreviewable.52 
C.  Motion to Reopen Case I 
In 2011, Buck attempted to reopen his case on the grounds that 
the prosecution violated the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses.53 The thrust of his argument was that the prosecution’s 
solicitation of and reference to Dr. Quijano’s testimony regarding the 
relationship between race and future dangerousness was 
unconstitutional.54 The Fifth Circuit denied Buck’s motion and, with 
Coleman still controlling, Buck did not attempt to pursue his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.55 
 In 2012, the United States Supreme Court made a ruling in 
Martinez v. Ryan56 which altered the rule set forth in Coleman.57 In 
Martinez, the Court held that where “a state formally limits the 
adjudication of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to 
collateral review,”58 a petitioner may establish cause for procedural 
default where: (1) “the state court[] did not appoint counsel in the 
initial-review collateral proceeding,” or “appointed counsel in [that] 
proceeding . . . was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. 
Washington [,]” and; (2) “the underlying . . . claim is a substantial one, 
which is to say that . . . the claim has some merit.”59 Not long after 
Martinez was decided, the United States Supreme Court determined 
 
 48. 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
 49. See Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 770. 
 50. Id. at 770–71. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 771. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. 566 U.S. 1 (2012). 
 57. Id. at 9. 
 58. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 771. 
 59. Id. (quoting Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14)). 
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in Trevino v. Thaler60 that “Martinez extended to state systems[, such 
as Texas,] that, as a practical matter, deny criminal defendants ‘a 
meaningful opportunity’ to press ineffective assistance claims on 
direct appeal.”61 During the time Trevino was being decided, Buck’s 
third state habeas petition was pending and ultimately denied.62 
D.  Motion to Reopen Case II 
In 2013, Buck filed a motion in federal court to reopen his section 
2254 case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).63 Relief 
specified in Rule 60(b)(6) may only be given in “extraordinary 
circumstances” and “such circumstances will rarely occur in the 
habeas context.”64 In support of Buck’s contention that his situation 
fit within this category of rare and extraordinary circumstances, he 
identified eleven factors which justified the reopening of the 
judgment.65 Some of the factors paralleled arguments Buck 
consistently made throughout his previous petitions, such as: Dr. 
Quijano’s race related testimony, the prosecutions race related 
questions on cross-examination, the State’s confession of error in 
similar cases, and the change in law resulting from Martinez and 
Trevino.66 
The district court denied relief on the grounds that Buck failed to 
satisfy both prongs of Rule 60(b)(6).67 The district court determined 
that a change in law did not qualify as an “extraordinary circumstance” 
in Buck’s case and noted that Buck’s case “is different in critical 
 
 60. 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013). 
 61. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 771 (quoting Trevino 133 S. Ct. at 1921)); Trevino 133 S. Ct. at 1921 
(identifying Texas as a state whose system denies criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to 
press ineffective assistance of counsel claims). 
 62. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 771. 
 63. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (stating that “(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, 
Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable 
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an 
opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it 
prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 64. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 771. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 772. 
 67. Id. 
(10) 51.2_RUBIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/19  6:57 PM 
482 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:475 
aspects” from those cases where the State admitted error.68 The district 
court went on to say that even if Buck’s situation were 
“extraordinary,” Buck’s claim would fail on the merits.69 The district 
court determined that Buck had failed to demonstrate he had been 
prejudiced by his trial attorney’s misnomer.70 The Court then stated 
that though Buck’s trial attorney performed below the proper standard, 
Buck’s crime was so heinous that Dr. Quijano’s discussion of race was 
“de minimis.”71 
Buck then attempted to appeal the denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion by filing an application for a certificate of appealability 
(“COA”) with the Fifth Circuit per 28 U.S.C. section 2253(c)(2).72 In 
order to obtain a COA, Buck was required to demonstrate “a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”73 The Fifth 
Circuit determined that Buck’s case was not unique and did not 
constitute an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief under Rule 
60(b)(6).74 As a result, the Fifth Circuit denied the application for a 
COA.75 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.76  
V.  CASE ANALYSIS 
A.  Review Standards for an Application for 
Certificate of Appealability 
The Supreme Court focused on the lower courts’ faulty legal 
analysis of Buck’s previous petitions.77 The Court noted that despite 
having recited the correct rules, the lower courts failed to apply them 
accurately.78 According to the Court, the proper analytic method for 
reviewing an appeal for an application for a COA is as follows: “A 
‘court of appeals should limit its examination [at the COA stage] to a 
threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of [the] claims,’ and ask 
‘only if the District Court’s decision was debatable.’”79  
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 772–73. 
 73. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (1996); Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 773. 
 74. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 773. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 773–74. 
 78. Id. at 773. 
 79. Id. (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 348 (2003)). 
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The Court elaborated on the “debatable” standard, holding that 
should a court of appeals determine “that a prisoner’s claim is not even 
debatable, that necessarily means the prisoner has failed to show that 
his claim is meritorious. But the converse is not true.”80 In order for a 
claim to be “debatable” a prisoner is not required to demonstrate that 
they will prevail on the claim—they simply need to prove it is 
possible.81 Furthermore, a claim may be found to be debatable even if 
after the COA has been granted, every jury of reason might later 
disagree that petitioner will not prevail.82 The Court concluded that 
when the order of the analysis is inverted and a court of appeals “‘first 
decides the merits of an appeal, . . . then justifies its denial of a COA 
based on its adjudication of the actual merits,’ it has placed too heavy 
a burden on the prisoner at the COA stage.”83 
The Supreme Court determined that Buck’s request for a COA 
raised two essential questions:  
first, whether reasonable jurists could debate the District 
Court’s conclusion that Buck was not denied his right to 
effective assistance of counsel under Strickland; and second, 
whether reasonable jurists could debate the District Court’s 
procedural holding that Buck had not made the necessary 
showing to reopen his case under Rule 60(b)(6).84 
A.  Buck’s Ineffective Counsel Claim 
A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing 
“that counsel performed deficiently and that counsel’s deficient 
performance caused [the claimant] prejudice.”85 The district court 
found that Buck’s trial counsel performed below the threshold of 
competent representation and the Supreme Court agreed.86 The plain 
fact that Buck’s counsel called Dr. Quijano to the stand and proceeded 
to elicit race-related testimony was sufficient to qualify as deficient 
performance.87 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. This would require the prisoner to prove his entire claim just to obtain a COA and 
therefore would require the appellate court to decide the absolute merits of the prisoner’s claim. 
 82. Id. (citing Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338). 
 83. Id. at 774 (quoting Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336–37) (internal brackets omitted).  
 84. Id. at 775. 
 85. Id. (emphasis added). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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The Supreme Court disagreed, however, with the district court’s 
finding that Buck failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by his trial 
counsel’s deficient performance.88 The Court noted there are a number 
of factors which were present at trial that clearly indicate prejudice.89 
The Court expressly rejected the district court’s remark that any 
mention of race was “de minimis” just because it was only mentioned 
briefly during the trial.90 Specifically, the Court focused on the 
potential impact Dr. Quijano’s testimony could have had on the jury, 
given that he was “an expert” and his actual testimony very clearly 
linked Buck’s race to a propensity for violence.91 As the Supreme 
Court put it, “the impact of . . . evidence cannot be measured simply 
by how much air time it received at trial or how many pages it occupies 
in the record. Some toxins can be deadly in small doses.”92 
B.  Buck’s Application to Reopen His Case Under Rule 60(b)(6) 
The Supreme Court determined that the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied Buck’s application to reopen his case under 
Rule 60(b)(6).93 The Court noted that the district court and Fifth 
Circuit’s classification of Buck’s case as “unremarkable,” simply 
because they deemed his claim as meritless, was ill-founded.94 The 
Supreme Court explained that any possibility that race was a factor in 
dispensing punishment to a defendant is a “disturbing departure 
from . . . our criminal justice system.”95 The Court then identified this 
departure as one which is “precisely among those we have identified 
as supporting relief under Rule 60(b)(4).”96 Accordingly, the Court 
reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case.97 
C.  Justice Thomas’s Dissent 
The most prevalent part of Justice Thomas’s dissent lies not 
within his disapproval of the majority’s method of analysis, but rather 
with his own determination of whether Dr. Quijano’s testimony 
 
 88. Id. at 776. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 777. 
 91. Id. at 776–77. 
 92. Id. at 777. 
 93. Id. at 778. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 781 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
(10) 51.2_RUBIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/19  6:57 PM 
2018]  BUCK’S FAITHFULNESS TO EQUAL PROTECTION 485 
actually prejudiced Buck.98 Justice Thomas agrees with the assertions 
of the lower courts that Buck failed to demonstrate that he was 
prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failed performance.99 Justice Thomas 
pointed to facts omitted by the majority which further support the 
incredibly heinous nature of Buck’s crimes and reiterated that the race-
related testimony was, in fact, “de minimis” when taking all the 
evidence together as a whole.100 
Justice Thomas further disagreed with the majority’s use of Equal 
Protection principles regarding race to determine a non-Equal 
Protection claim.101 Justice Thomas “agree[d] that racial 
classifications are categorically impermissible under the Equal 
Protection Clause—but [because Buck was] not raising an equal 
protection claim,” he found the consideration of potential 
discrimination is inappropriate.102 Furthermore, Justice Thomas noted 
that the “majority identifies no precedents regarding race in the Rule 
60(b)(6) context.”103 
Justice Thomas also focused on the fact that it was Buck’s own 
counsel who introduced Dr. Quijano’s testimony,104 and used this fact 
to support the notion that there was no harm to public confidence in 
the judicial system.105 Justice Thomas claimed that this was 
particularly true given the “de minimis” nature of the testimony.106 
VI.  DISCUSSION 
This Comment argues that Buck v. Davis107 was decided 
correctly. The majority provided clarity on the logical sequence of 
analysis that should necessarily follow any inquiry into whether a 
certificate of appealability should be granted. However, the 
significance of this case goes beyond the clarity provided—it also 
engaged in a discussion of race outside the traditional context of equal 
 
 98. Id. at 782. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 782–83. The dissent specifically referred to the fact that Buck drove 28 miles to reach 
the home of Gardner with the specific intent of shooting her and whoever was inside. Buck 
proceeded to taunt Gardner after he inflicted the fatal shot, and laughed with no apparent remorse 
when taken into custody. Id. at 783. 
 101. Id. at 784. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017). 
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protection.  
The central question which seemed to stem from the lower 
courts’, the majority’s, and the dissent’s discussions was: is there such 
a thing as “de minimis” race-related testimony—particularly when 
given by a court appointed expert?108 Both the majority and the dissent 
engaged in a fact intensive analysis to support the idea that Dr. 
Quijano’s testimony either was or was not “de minimis.”109 The 
majority differed, however, when the discussion turned away from the 
facts immediately surrounding Buck’s case and towards a general 
philosophy of legal determinations/verdicts influenced by racial 
prejudice.110  
Ideally, the judicial system operates in way that is free from 
discrimination when determining the merits of a case.111 As Justice 
Harlan put it, “our Constitution is color-blind.”112 This statement 
accurately reflects an overall view that the judicial system maintains 
the “obligation . . . to treat similar persons similarly, declaring certain 
individual characteristics—such as color—irrelevant.”113 Should this 
view only be honored when equal protection claims arise, it would 
create inconsistency among the courts in both outcome and principle. 
Courts should strive to maintain consistent “color-blindness” in their 
courtrooms. 
Here, Buck was required to show that there was “a reasonable 
probability that, but for [his] counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.”114 Such a standard 
places a heavy burden on the defendant and necessarily requires the 
Court to make a (best guess) determination on how heavily the jury 
weighed each piece of evidence.115 While there may be indicators to 
suggest what evidence the jury gave weight to, such as sending notes 
to request further evidence, it is difficult to ascertain with certainty the 
 
 108. See id. at 777 (majority opinion), 782 (Thomas J., dissenting). 
 109. See id. at 777 (majority opinion), 782–83 (Thomas J., dissenting). 
 110. See id. at 778 (majority opinion). 
 111. See Fiss, supra note 2, at 119. 
 112. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 113. Fiss, supra note 2, at 120. 
 114. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 776 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). The 
Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims requires a showing of: (1) counsel’s 
deficient performance, which causes the defendant (2) prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 115. See Josh Bowers, ABA Policy on the Strickland Prejudice Prong, AM. BAR ASS’N 3 (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/criminal_ 
justice/ABApolicy_StricklandPrejudiceProng.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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true weight given to each piece of evidence. Given that the nature of 
this inquiry is a guessing game, it can be inferred that the majority in 
Buck set forth a general presumption that race-related testimony 
greatly prejudices a defendant, regardless of surrounding evidence. 
This is especially supported by the majority’s discussion of the 
potential poisonous effect of race-related expert testimony. 
Justice Thomas’s assertion that the use of equal-protection-like 
notions of racial discrimination were inappropriate in Buck’s case 
implies a misguided view of the judicial system. It does not follow that 
the legal community applies harsh scrutiny of racial discrimination 
under equal protection claims but fails to do so in other contexts. This 
holds particularly true when considering the “emotional and complex” 
determination that is required of juries in capital sentencing cases.116 
To hold that race-related expert testimony had only a “de minimis” 
effect on a jury in a capital sentencing case would undermine the 
notion of constitutional “color-blindness” that the judiciary seeks to 
maintain.117 
It is generally accepted that the allowance of race-based 
classifications or discrimination to permeate the justice system is 
impermissible.118 As such, the majority correctly exercised precaution 
in its reversal in not taking for granted what the jury may or may not 
have found persuasive in its decision to sentence Buck to death. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The true measure of the effect of Dr. Quijano’s testimony on the 
jury the day Buck was sentenced to death is, at best, a guess. Absent 
knowledge of what occurred during jury deliberations, it is difficult to 
answer the question “what if the jury never heard this piece of 
evidence?” The majority in Buck recognized the dangers of assuming 
the answer to that question, where race possibly played a role in 
determining the life and death of an individual.119 This recognition 
reflects the notion that equal-protection-like views towards racial 
discrimination can, and should, exist outside the context of equal 
protection claims. 
 
 116. Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A Critique of Death 
Penalty Habeas Corpus (Part One), 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1327, 1355 (1995) (discussing a jury’s 
considerations when determining whether to vote for a capital sentence). 
 117. See, e.g., Peery, supra note 1, at 473. 
 118. Fiss, supra note 2, at 129. 
 119. See Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 777. 
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